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CaseNo.20060949-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Edward Allen Walker,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals convictions for possession of a clandestine lab or supplies,
a first degree felony, and possession of controlled substance, a third degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp.
2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue: Did the State violate defendant's right to a speedy trial when it tried
defendant on two felonies less than five months after filing charges?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a speedy trial
motion for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, f 7,44 P.3d 835.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial..."
Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6 (West 2004): A defendant is entitled "to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of court
permits."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 17, 2004, officers observed defendant leaving a meth lab in
West Valley City. R. 5. Officers arrested defendant that day on outstanding
warrants, R. 2,203:22, and then arrested defendant on these charges on January 26,
2005. R. 7. On January 26, 2005, the State also filed an Information charging
defendant with one count of possessing a clandestine lab or supplies, a first degree
felony, and one count of possessing methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R. 13.
On March 17,2005, the trial court held a preliminary hearing, R. 24-25; 224:123. During that hearing, a detective mentioned that he had recorded the initial
interview with defendant. R. 224:14. Defense counsel objected, claiming that he
had not yet received a copy of that recording. R. 224:14-15. The court accordingly
continued the preliminary hearing. R. 24-25. The preliminary hearing concluded on
2

April 7,2005; at the close of evidence, the court bound defendant over for trial. R.
43-44; 226:13.
On April 19,2005, the court held a hearing at which defendant invoked his
right to be tried within 30 days of arraignment. R. 228:2. l The court scheduled a
two-day jury trial for May 16-17,2005. R. 51-52; R. 228:2.
On May 13, 2005, however, the court made a docket entry stating that the
"State prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for emergency, trial continued as per
phone conference with Nathan Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's
chambers." Addendum A.2 As a result, defendant's trial was continued to June 6-7,
2005. R. 86-89,144-45.
On June 3, 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. R. 79-83. Defendant
argued that the State had violated his statutory right to have a trial within 30 days of
arraignment. R. 79-83. The parties argued this motion on the morning of trial. R.
229: 8-12. During argument, defense counsel noted that while the court had
1

The record does not contain a minute entry indicating when the arraignment
actually occurred. Prior to trial, the prosecutor suggested that the arraignment
likely occurred following the April 7, 2005, bindover. R. 229: 10. In his brief,
defendant notes that this would have been consistent with rule 10(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. 10. For purposes of this appeal, the State does not
dispute this suggestion.
Nathan Jardine was defendant's trial counsel. R. 229-30. Patricia Cassell is
an attorney in the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office.
3

originally scheduled a trial for May 16-17, 2005, the "prosecution could not go
forward on that date." R. 229:8. The prosecutor confirmed this, explaining that he
"was unable to proceed on that day." R. 229:10.
The court denied defendant's motion.

The court explained that the

continuance was necessary because the prosecutor had "an emergency situation at
the last minute with the illness of his mother in a different state, necessitating his
travel." R. 229:12. The court concluded that this was a "legitimate" reason for
pushing the trial back because it "would have been impossible for the State to have
a new prosecutor assigned" on such short notice. R. 229:12-13.
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury convicted defendant on both
counts. R. 145.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
In late 2004, officers from a narcotics task force received a tip that defendant
was operating a meth lab out of an apartment in Murray. R. 229: 114,125. On
November 17,2004, officers began conducting surveillance on that apartment. R.
229:113.
3

"In setting out the facts from the record on a p p e a l . . . all conflicts and
doubts" are resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial
court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,11 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quotations and citation
omitted).
4

Shortly after officers got into position, two detectives observed defendant exit
the apartment with a female companion. R. 229: 115-17. Defendant and his
companion were gone for 10 minutes and then returned to the apartment. R. 229:
117. Three hours later, defendant and his companion emerged again. R. 229:120-21.
The female was carrying a thermos and some small bags. R. 229: 95. Defendant
opened the hood of a car, and then took the thermos and bags and began securing
them in the engine compartment. R. 229: 95; 203. One of the detectives later
testified that drug dealers commonly hide contraband in the engine compartment of
cars. R. 229: 209.
The detectives approached defendant and arrested him. R. 229:98.4 Officers
found a syringe in defendant's pocket. R. 229:204. The officers pulled the bags and
thermos out from under the hood of the car. R. 229:204. Inside, they found iodine
crystals, tubing, and methamphetamine. R. 229:204.
Defendant's companion consented to a search of the apartment. There was a
"thick" "chemical smell" in the apartment, and the back bedrooms were filled with
a "hazy smoke." R. 229:123. Officers were concerned about the presence of "toxic
chemicals," so they exited the apartment and donned respirators. R. 229:124. After

4

Defendant has not challenged the legality of the arrest.
5

resuming the search, they found meth lab components "scattered throughout the
apartment" R. 229:147. Specifically, officers found glass jars and cylinders (229:
124), iodine in a glass jar (R. 229:185),5 clear liquids and tubing (229:188), a onegallon jug of muriatic acid (229:189), a container with a "dark, blue-colored crystal"
(229: 127), and a coffee pot with "red sludge in the bottom of it" (R. 229: 187).
Officers also found sodium hydroxide, pseudoephedrine, hydrochloric acid, and
phosphorous, all of which are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. R.
229:174-77. Finally, officers found completed methamphetamine. R. 229:174-77.
One of the detectives gave defendant his Miranda warnings and then
interviewed himi. R. 229:132. At the beginning of the interview, defendant told the
detective: "If you guys been watching the place for awhile, you probably know
what's really been going on here." Exhibit A at 30:40-30:47.6 Defendant admitted
that he "knew what was going on" at the apartment, but claimed that while he had
smoked methamphetamine at the apartment and had helped clean the apartment,
he had not helped manufacture methamphetamine. Exhibit A at 37:15-30. After
further questioning, however, defendant admitted that he had had some
5

Iodine acts as a "reagent" in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. R.
229:172.
6

Exhibit A is a recording of the interview that defendant introduced at trial.
This exhibit is contained in a non-paginated manila folder in the record.
6

involvement with the lab: "I'm not telling you f-ing that I f-ing didn't have any
involvement in it." Exhibit A at 40: 30-40. Defendant also admitted that he had
helped dismantle the lab. Exhibit A at 40:50-55. As questioning progressed further,
defendant also admitted that he had given the occupants "a few pointers" on how to
properly make methamphetamine. Exhibit A at 45:00-47:30.
At trial, defendant again admitted that he had given tips on how to make
methamphetamine to the operators of the lab, that he had helped them dismantle
the methamphetamine lab, and that he had been smoking methamphetamine prior
to being arrested. R. 230:38-39,42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that he is entitled to relief because the State failed to try him
within 30 days of his arraignment. Defendant waived this claim, however, by
repeatedly agreeing to a trial date that was beyond the 30-day limit. This Court
therefore should not address this claim.
In any event, the 30-day rule set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6 (West
2004) is not mandatory. Instead, a violation of § 77-1-6 simply triggers review
under the four-factor constitutional test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972). Under Barker, the court considers: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons

7

for the delay, (3) defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice suffered by
defendant.
Applied to this case, these factors do not warrant reversal. First, the length of
delay was minimal, particularly given the complexities of this prosecution. Second,
while the State did request a continuance of the originally scheduled trial, it only
did so because of the prosecutor's unavoidable family emergency. This was not
oppressive or persecutorial in nature.

Third, defendant never invoked his

constitutional right to a speedy trial, and he twice agreed to a trial date that was
more than 30 days from his arraignment. Fourth, defendant has not demonstrated
that he was prejudiced by the delay in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A SPEEDY TRIAL
VIOLATION WHERE HE WAS TRIED LESS THAN FIVE
MONTHS AFTER BEING CHARGED
A. Defendant waived this claim by affirmatively agreeing to a trial
date that was beyond the 30-day limit.
Defendant claims that he is entitled to relief under Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-1-6 (West 2004) because he was not tried within 30 days of arraignment. Aplt.
Br. 10-21. Under the invited error doctrine, however, a party cannot "set[ ] up an
error at trial and then complain[ ] of it on appeal/' State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,

8

1205 (Utah App, 1991) (quotations and citation omitted). "[UJnder the doctrine of
invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she
had no objection to the [action taken]/' State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114,128 P.3d
1171 (second alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also
State v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350, f 25,172 P.3d 319.
In this case, defendant expressly agreed to a trial date that was more than 30
days after his arraignment. Specifically, on April 19,2005, the trial court scheduled
a two-day trial that would begin on May 16,2005. R. 228:2. Although this would
have been 39 days after defendant's April 7 arraignment, defendant expressly
agreed to that trial date. R. 228:2. When the issue was subsequently raised during
arguments on defendant's motion to dismiss, defendant affirmatively stated that he
would not "have had an objection" had the trial occurred on May 16. R. 229:12.
Thus, although defendant now claims that the court violated his rights under
Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6, defendant expressly agreed to a trial date that
violated this very statute, and he later reaffirmed that he would not have objected to
that initial date. Insofar as defendant expressly agreed that the court could violate
the statute that is now at issue, this Court should not review this claim.

9

B. If addressed on its merits, defendant's claim should be analyzed
under the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.
Under § 77-l-6(l)(h), a defendant is entitled "to a trial within 30 days after
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of court permits." Utah courts
have repeatedly held that the 30-day rule set forth in § 77-l-6(l)(h) is "directory in
nature, not mandatory." State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,207 (Utah App. 1991); accord
State v. Trafny, 799 R2d 704,708 (Utah 1990); State v. Menzies, 601 P.2d 925,926 (Utah
1979). When the 30-day rule is violated, the result is not dismissal; rather, the
statutory violation acts as a "triggering mechanism" for a review of the case under
the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 207.7
In Barker, the Supreme Court identified four factors that should be considered
when a defendant claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was
violated: the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. But courts are not
always required to examine all four factors. Instead, the first factor, the length of the
delay, acts as a "triggering mechanism" for the remaining factors. Id. If the

7

In Hoyt, this Court explained that § 77-l-6(l)(h) is "designed to implement
the 'speedy trial' guaranty of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,207 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). A violation of
§ 77-l-6(l)(h) is therefore analyzed "with reference primarily to Sixth Amendment
cases." Id.
10

delay is long enough to be considered "presumptively prejudicial/' courts examine
all four factors; if the delay is not long length to be considered presumptively
prejudicial, however, the length of delay is considered dispositive and courts do not
examine the remaining factors.

Id. When analyzed under the constitutional

standard, delays are typically considered to be presumptively prejudicial when they
"approach[ ] one year." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,652 n.l (1992).
In this case, the delay between defendant's charge and trial did not approach
one year. But the delay between the arraignment and the trial exceeded 30 days,
thus violating Utah Code Annotated § 774-6. Specifically, defendant was arraigned
on April 7, 2005, and tried on June 6, 2005, a delay of 60 days. Under Hoyt and
Trafny, this violation acted as a triggering mechanism, thereby requiring a full
analysis under the four factors set forth in Barker.
C. The delay in this case did not violate the test set forth in Barker v.
Wingo.
In Barker, the defendant claimed that the five-year delay between his arrest
and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 516-19. The Supreme
Court rejected that claim. Id. at 533-36. The Court noted that it is "impossible to
determine with precision when the right [to a speedy trial] has been denied," and
held that "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of

11

the right in the particular context of the case." Id. at 521-22. Recognizing that a
"balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis," Barker directed courts to examine the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. These factors are not considered in isolation, however, and
no one factor is controlling. In Barker, the Court "regard[ed] none of the four factors
identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533.
When applied to this case, these factors do not warrant reversal.
1. The length of the delay in this case was acceptable under
Barker.
Under Barker, the court examines the time between the defendant's "formal
indictment, information, or arrest," and the defendant's trial. State v. Hales, 2007 UT
14,142,152 P.3d 321; see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,310-11 (1986);
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Though the length of delay varies case-to-case, the delay in
this case was well within the range of delays that have been approved in other
speedy trial cases.

12

In Barker, for example, the Supreme Court held that a five-year delay between
arrest and trial was justifiable under the facts of that case. Id. at 533-536. Utah's
courts have also repeatedly permitted delays that approached or exceeded one year.
See, e.g., State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1987) (affirming a delay of four
years and six months); State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665,669-70 (Utah 1997) (affirming
a delay of three years and one month); State v. Mejia, 2007 UT App 337, f ! 9-14,172
P.3d 315 (affirming a 15-month delay); State v. Willett, 909 R2d 218,225 (Utah 1995)
(affirming a 345-day delay); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah App. 1991)
(affirming a 316-day delay); State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, I f 27-35,138 P.3d 97
(affirming a 315-day delay).
Defendant was arrested on these charges on January 26,2005, and his trial
began on June 6,2005, a period of 131 days. This period was well within the range
of delays that have been approved by Utah's courts.
2. Defendant has not identified any improper reason for delay in
this case.
Under the second Barker factor, the court considers the reasons for the delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. When considering this factor, "different weights must be
assigned to the varying justifications and reasons/' State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1328 (Utah 1986). In general, the reasons for delay are evaluated on a three-part

13

sliding scale: (1) "deliberate attempts] to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense" are "weighted heavily against the government"; (2) "more neutral
reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts" are "weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant"; and
(3) "valid reason[s], such as a missing witness... serve to justify the appropriate
delay." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
By refusing the penalize the government when the delay is caused by "valid
reasons," id., the speedy trial right protects the government when it pursues its case
"with reasonable diligence." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992).
Moreover, insofaor as the Constitution only requires the State to act with "ordinary"
or "customary promptness," the reasons for the delay are ultimately weighed in
light of "the nature of the charges." Id. at 652,652 n.l; cf. Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708-09
(directing courts to "look to the totality of the circumstances" when evaluating
claims under Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6); State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710,712 (Utah
1969) ("Each case must be examined in light of its own particular facts."). Thus, a
greater period of delay is acceptable when the defendant is prosecuted for
"'serious'" or "'[more] complex' crimes." Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, % 27 (quoting
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)).
14

In this case, defendant was charged with a first degree felony and a third
degree felony. In order to prove its case, the State was required to prove that the
chemicals and paraphernalia found inside the apartment were actually components
of a meth lab. To do this, the State collected a large number of samples from the
apartment and then submitted those samples to the Utah State Crime Lab for
testing. See generally R. 229: 163-181. The resulting trial involved two days of
testimony, the testimony of six prosecution witnesses, the cross-examination of
defendant, and the submission of 53 different prosecution exhibits. See R. 229-30
(index of witnesses and exhibits). Given this complexity, the State had a justifiable
reason for taking five months to bring defendant to trial.
In response, defendant claims that the State should at least be faulted for the
delay that occurred when the court moved the trial from May 16, 2005, to June 6,
2005. As a threshold matter, defendant is incorrect when he claims that "the record
fails to contain anything about the circumstances" surrounding this continuance.
Aplt. Br. 16-17. In his initial motion to dismiss, defense counsel explained that "the
prosecution requested a continuance which was granted by the court to
accommodate the prosecuting attorney who was assigned to the case/7 R. 82. The
court's docket entry for May 13, 2005, provides additional detail: "Note: State
prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for emergency, trial continued as per phone
15

conference with Nathan Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's chambers/'
Addendum A, Finally, during arguments on defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court explained from the bench that the prosecutor had "an emergency situation at
the last minute with the illness of his mother in a different state, necessitating his
travel." R. 229:12.
Given this, the delay at issue here was not "oppressive or persecutorial in
nature." State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1978). Rather, this delay was
simply the result of an unforeseen family emergency. Though defendant now
claims that the State should have reassigned another prosecutor at the last minute,
the trial court specifically concluded that this would have been impracticable tinder
the circumstances. R. 229:12-13. In any event, even if the State should be charged
for the three-week delay stemming from the prosecutor's family emergency, this
delay would at most be one of "negligence," a decidedly "neutral reason" that is
"weighted less heavily" in the ultimate analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
In short, there is no evidence in this case that the prosecution intentionally
delayed the prosecution. By trying this first degree felony jury trial within five
months of filing charges, the prosecution acted with "reasonable diligence."
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. The delays therefore should not be weighted against the
State.
16

1. Defendant did not invoke his right to a speedy trial in a timely
manner.
Under the third Barker factor, the court considers when the defendant first
asserted his speedy trial right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. This Court has held that a
failure "to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial/" Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215 at 132 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at
532).
Defendant did not invoke his constitutional right to a speedy trial in any
proceeding below. Defendant first invoked his rights under Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-1-6 on April 19,2005, R. 228:2, a mere 48 days before the beginning of his twoday trial. Though this exceeded the 30-days allowed by § 77-1-6, defendant agreed
to a delay that was beyond 30-days from arraignment on two different occasions.
Specifically, during the April 19 hearing, defendant agreed that the trial could begin
on May 16, 2005, which was 39 days after the April 7 arraignment. R. 228: 2.
Defendant reiterated this at the beginning of the June 6,2005, trial, stating that he
would not "have had an objection" had the trial occurred on May 16,2005. R. 229:
12. Given this, defendant has waived the right to claim that the State should have
been strictly held to the statute's 30-day requirement.

17

Defendant therefore failed to ever raise his constitutional right, and he twice
agreed to a trial setting that exceeded the statutory right at issue. This factor should
not be weighed against the State.
4. Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in this case.
Under the fourth Barker factor, the court considers whether the defendant has
been prejudiced by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Such prejudice can be shown
in a number of ways, including "oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and
concern of the accused, and the possibility that the accused's defense will be
impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence." Doggett, 505
U.S. at 654 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The impairment to a
defendant's case through loss of memory or evidence is "the most serious" form of
prejudice, insofar as "the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Defendant identifies three different sources of alleged prejudice. Aplt. Br. 1821. Viewed in context, however, none should be weighed against the State.
Defendant first claims that he was prejudiced because the parole board
revoked his parole after he was arrested on these charges, but then refused to

18

schedule a revocation hearing until after these charges were adjudicated. Aplt. Br.
18.
Nothing in the record identifies the conditions of defendant's parole from his
prior conviction, nor does the record show when or why his parole was revoked.
More importantly, no evidence suggests that defendant was actually promised that
he would actually receive a new revocation hearing after these charges were
adjudicated. Without such evidence, this Court has no way to evaluate either the
veracity or merits of defendant's claim. This claim should be rejected for this reason
alone.8
Even if the parole board had promised defendant a revocation hearing upon
completion of this case, however, defendant still has not demonstrated prejudice.
While defendant claims that "an immediate resolution" of this case may "have been
relevant to his opportunity for a hearing with the parole board," Aplt. Br. 18,

At the motion hearing below, defense counsel did argue that the "reason Mr.
Walker is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison is because of the parole violation that
is associated with these charges." R. 229:11. Defense counsel also made this claim
in his motion to dismiss. R. 77. But defense counsel did not support this claim with
any affidavits or documentation establishing that the parole board had made any
specific promises. Moreover, defense counsel's statements are not evidence. State v.
Devey, 2006 UT App 219, \ 16,138 P.3d 90.
19

defendant would only have been prejudiced if earlier resolution would have
resulted in release or parole.
At the trial below, however, defendant admitted that he smoked
methamphetamine throughout the day, that he had told his companions how to
properly make methamphetamine, that he had helped them dismantle the meth lab,
and that he had lied to a detective during his initial interview. R. 230:37-42,52. All
of this conduct would presumably have violated defendant's parole in the earlier
case.
Moreover, defendant was ultimately convicted in this case, and he has not
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Thus, regardless of whether
defendant's parole was ultimately reviewed on May 18, 2005, or whether it was
instead reviewed on June 8, 2005, the end result would have been the same.
Specifically, defendant would have stood before the parole board freshly convicted
of a first degree felony. Defendant has not shown that the parole board was likely
to have released him under these circumstances.
Defendant next claims that he was prejudiced because of the anxiety
associated with this delay. Aplt. Br. 18-19. This argument is belied by the fact that
on two different occasions, defendant stated that he would not have objected had
the trial been held on May 16,2005, as originally planned. R. 228:2 (April 19,2005)
20

(Defense counsel: "I think we're entitled to 30 days, aren't we?" Court clerk: "We
can go to May 16th and 17th." Defense counsel: "Very well."); R. 229:12 (June 6,
2005) ("I think if we'd gone forward at the first setting of this matter, I don't think
we would have had an objection."). Given this, defendant can only point to the
additional anxiety associated with the move from May 16, 2005, to June 6, 2005.
This Court should decline to overturn defendant's conviction on such a minimal
basis.
Finally, defendant claims that his trial defense was prejudiced by this delay.
Aplt. Br. 19-21. Specifically, defendant suggests that though two detectives both
testified that they saw defendant hiding bags under the hood of the car, "the delay
and the passage of time affected or altered the detectives' perceptions of the events
to the detriment of Walker's defense." Aplt. Br. 21.
Defendant's claim is speculative. Defendant does not point to any fact that
either detective had difficulty remembering at trial, nor does he point to any
evidence from the record showing that either detective had any memory problems.
Even if it were true that the delay in this case impacted the officers' memory,
however, defendant still has not shown that the memory problems of the
prosecution's witnesses prejudiced him. The Supreme Court has recognized that
faded memories actually help a defendant, rather than hurt him. "As the time
21

between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become
unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution,
its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so." Barker, 407 U.S. at 521; accord
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,330 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Just as
delay may impair the ability of the accused to defend himself, so it may reduce the
capacity of the government to prove its case/'). Thus, even if it were true that the
five-month delay had clouded the detectives' "perceptions," Aplt. Br. 21, this would
only have created an additional source of reasonable doubt, thereby benefiting
defendant.
In any evcnit, even if the five-month delay did alter these two detectives'
memories, and even if the resultant impairment did harm defendant at trial, he still
has not shown prejudice. Contrary to defendant's claim, he was not convicted just
because two detectives saw him place a bag under the hood of a car. After spending
several hours in a chemical-haze filled apartment with an operating meth lab,
defendant told officers that he "knew what was going on in the apartment" and
couldn't claim that he "didn't have any involvement" with the lab. Exhibit A at 37:
20-22; 40: 30-40.

Defendant later admitted that he had been smoking

methamphetamine all day, that he told his two companions how to cook
methamphetamine, that he helped clean the apartment, and that he helped
22

dismantle the lab. R. 230: 38-42. This imcontroverted evidence was sufficient to
convict defendant even without the challenged testimony.
*****

In sum: (1) the delay in this case was minimal; (2) the delay was justified by
the State's legitimate need to properly prepare and try its case; (3) defendant never
invoked his constitutional speedy trial rights, and he expressly agreed to a trial date
that exceeded the 30-day rule set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6; and (4)
defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the delay.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted December Y\. 2008.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs, EDWARD ALLEN WALKER
CASE NUMBER 051100261 State Felony

Defendants KARMA LYNN GROESBECK, EDWARD ALLEN WALKER, CATHERINE
M AUSTIN, are linked.
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 58-37D-4(l)(B) - POSSESSION OF CLANDESTINE LAB
EQUIP/SUPP 1st Degree Felony
Offense Date: November 17, 2004, 538 W MURRAY BLVD
Disposition: June 13, 2005 Transferred
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) - POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: November 17, 2004, 538 W MURRAY BLVD
Disposition: June 13, 2005 Transferred

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
MARK KOURIS
PARTIES
Defendant - EDWARD ALLEN WALKER
Represented by: NATHAN N JARDINE
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: EDWARD ALLEN WALKER
Offense tracking number: 16348351
Date of Birth: May 04, 1963
Jail Booking Number: 16348351
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE
LEA Case Number: 041059168
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 04021952
Sheriff Office Number: 0155689
ACCOUNT SUMMARY

PROCEEDINGS
01-27-05 Case filed
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01-27-05 Filed: From an Information
01-27-05 Warrant ordered on: January 27, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141510
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
01-27-05 Warrant issued on: January 27, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141510 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
Judge: PAT B BRIAN
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement.
02-09-05 Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY assigned.
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02-09-05 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on February 15, 2005 at 01:00 PM
with Judge KENNEDY.
02-15-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
cindye
Defendant
Defendant pro se
Audio
Tape Number:

5016

Tape Count: 143

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
The defendant waives right to counsel.
Def intends to retain counsel
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 03/10/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
02-16-05 Warrant recalled on: February 16, 2005 Warrant num: 981141510
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant
appeared.
02-16-05 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 10, 2005 at 01:00 PM with Judge
KENNEDY.
03-08-05 Filed: Notice of Appearance, Entry of Not Guilty Plea, Request
for PreTrial Hearing and Demand for Jury Trial, Nathan N
Jardme
03-08-05 Filed: Request for Discovery
03-11-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on March 17, 2005 at 01:00 PM
with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
03-11-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
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Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, SANDI
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05018

Tape Count: 1.51

Set for Preliminary hearing on next available calendar.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/17/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
03-14-05 Note: PRELIMINARY HEARING calendar modified. Judge assignment
Changed from KENNEDY, JOHN PAUL to CHRISTIANSEN, TERRY.
Appearance on 3/17/2005. Reason: Clerk error.
03-17-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on March 29, 2005 at 01:00 PM
with Judge KENNEDY.
03-17-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
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PRESENT

Clerk:
deniseo
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05021

Tape Count: 2.24

HEARING |
TAPE: 05021
COUNT: 2.24
On record All parties present in court room #3.
COUNT: 2.25
State's witness #1 - Officer Kent Stokes - direct exam
COUNT: 2.49
State's exhibit #1 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.49
Cross exam of State's witness #1
Reset Preliminary to allow State to provide tape to defense
attorney.
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
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Date: 03/29/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
03-29-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on April 07, 2005 at 01:00 PM
with Judge KENNEDY.
03-29-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED
Prosecutor: PLAYER, RILEY J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05029

Tape Count: 2.12

Defense attorney needs more time to review audio tape, reset for
Preliminary hearing.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 04/07/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
04-07-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE
Prosecutor: CORDOVA, KIM
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05030

Tape Count: 1.42
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HEARING

TAPE: 05030
COUNT: 1.42
On record all parties present in the courtroom to resume
Preliminary hearing.
COUNT: 1.45
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State's witness #1 - Detective Ken Stokes - direct exam
COUNT: 1.49
Cross exam of State's witness #1
COUNT: 1.52
State rests
COUNT: 1.54
State's exhibit #1 received into evidence
COUNT: 1.54
On advise of attorney, defendant does not testify. Defense rests
and submits.
COUNT: 1.55
Court finds sufficient evidence to support probable cause on both
counts. Court binds case over for trial. Set for BO/PTC.
BO/PTC is scheduled.
Date: 04/14/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: SECOND FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 SOUTH 2700 WEST
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: PAT B. BRIAN
04-07-05 BO/PTC scheduled on April 14, 2005 at 01:00 PM in Third Floor
with Judge BRIAN.
04-12-05 BO/PTC rescheduled on April 13, 2005 at 01:00 PM
Reason:
Correct calendar.
04-13-05 PTC - BO scheduled on April 21, 2005 at 01:00 PM with Judge
KENNEDY.
04-13-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
PAT B. BRIAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cindye
Prosecutor: TORRIENTE, SEAN M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

5024

Tape Count: 242

HEARING
TAPE: 5024
COUNT: 242
On record
On record
On def motion court orders hearing continued to next available
calendar
PTC - BO is scheduled.
Date: 04/21/2005
Time: 01:00 p.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
04-14-05 PTC - BO rescheduled on April 19, 2005 at 01:00 PM
Reason:
Conflict in attorney schedule.
04-19-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on May 16, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge
KENNEDY.
04-19-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on May 17, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge
KENNEDY.
04-19-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05031

Tape Count: 1.34

Set for two-day Jury on next available date. No final PTC needed.
Parties to submit jury instructions and any motion prior to trial
date.
TWO-DAY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 05/16/2005
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
TWO-DAY TRIAL.
Date: 05/17/2005
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: FIRST FLOOR
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
05-13-05 Note: State prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for
emergency, trial continued as per phone conference with Nathan
Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's chambers.
05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on June 06, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge
KENNEDY.
05-13-05 JURY TRIAL scheduled on June 07, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge
KENNEDY.
05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL Cancelled.
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05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL Cancelled.
06-02-05 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing dated 3-17-05, Ed
Midgley, Court Reporter
06-02-05 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing, volume II, dated
4-7-05, Suzanne Warnick, Court Reporter
06-06-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05052

Tape Count: 9.02
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TRIAL
TAPE: 05052
COUNT: 9.02
On record outside of jury, all parties present in the courtroom.
Defense attorney, Nathan Jardine, motions court to dismiss case
based on the Preliminary hearing being outside of the 10-day
period.
COUNT: 9.11
State attorney, James Cope argues
COUNT: 9.13
Court finds the rules of the Preliminary hearing were correct and
timely and denies Defense Motion to Dismiss case.
COUNT: 9.17
Court rules on Defense Motion in Limine
COUNT: 9.39
Jurors in courtroom, oath administered, Voir Dire by court and
attorneys
COUNT: 1056
Jury impaneled and the oath administered to the impaneled Jury #1 Christian Van Leeuwen - #2 Rachael Hardy - #3 Brenda Willis - #4
Joshua Bryner - #5 Toni Cornell - #6 Brett Tiedemann - #7 Stephen
Koester - #8 Michael James Robertson.
COUNT: 11.02
Outside of Jury, Defense motions to stike the Jury impaneled based
on no follow-up questions to Juror #6 and #7
COUNT: 11.06
State objects
COUNT: 11.07
Court finds that the Jury panel was forthright, that the Jury
meets the standard and are legally qualified to serve and therefore
the Court denies the Defense motion to strike the impaneled Jury.
COUNT: 11.20
All parties, including the Jury present in the courtroom, Court
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reads instructions to Jury.
COUNT: 11.38
Opening Statement - State
COUNT: 11.58
Opening Statment - Defense
COUNT: 12.04
Outside of Jury - Defense motions for continuance based on
Discovery issues. Defense motions for Mistrial
COUNT: 12.07
State responds
COUNT: 12.14
Court will allow defense time today to review State's photos, and
denies Defense motion for Limine and for Mistrial.
COUNT: 1.51
All parties present in the courtroom including the Jury. State's
witness #1 - Officer Aaron Cheshire - direct exam
COUNT: 2.07
Plaintiff exhibit #12, 13, 14 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.08
Plaintiff exhibit 6 - 1 1 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.09
Cross exam of Plaintiff Witness #1
COUNT: 2.13
Re-direct exam of Plaintiff Witness #1
COUNT: 2.15
Plaintiff Witness #2 - Detective Kent Stokes - direct exam
COUNT: 2.34
Plaintiff exhibit #1, 2, 3 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.36
Plaintiff exhibit # 1 5 , 16 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.37
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Plaintiff exhibit #17, 18, 19 received into evidence
COUNT: 2.39
Plaintiff exhibit 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 received into evidence
COUNT: 3.03
Cross exam of Plaintiff Witness #2
COUNT: 3.26
Defendant Exhibit A received into evidence
COUNT: 3.52
Plaintiff witness #3 - Mike Hepworth - direct exam
COUNT: 4.14
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #3
COUNT: 4.19
Plaintiff Witness #4 - Detective Robert Idle - direct exam
COUNT: 4.22
Plaintiff exhibit #24 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.23
Plaintiff exhibit #25 received into evidence
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COUNT: 4.24
Plaintiff exhibit #51 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.26
Plaintiff exhibits #26 and #27 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.27
Plaintiff exhibit #28 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.30
Plaintiff exhibits #29, #30, #4, #5, #20, #21, #22, #23, #36, #37,
#42, #44, #45, #46, #47, #48, #49, #50 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.33
Plaintiff exhibits #52 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.35
Plaintiff witness #5, Detective Steve Ward - direct exam
COUNT: 4.40
Plaintiff exhibits $38, #39, #40, #41 received into evidence
COUNT: 4.41
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #5
COUNT: 4.43
Plaintiff Witness #6 - Detective Matt Carmen - direct exam
COUNT: 4.48
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #6
Court reporter, Michelle Batty, present for all court proceedings.
6-06-05 Note: JURY TRIAL minutes modified.
6-07-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
PRESENT
Clerk:
deniseo
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N
Audio
Tape Number:

05052

Tape Count: 8.38

TRIAL
TAPE: 05052
COUNT: 8.38
On record 2nd day of trial.outside of Jury, court and attorneys
discuss jury instruction issues.
COUNT: 8.45
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #2
COUNT: 9.33
Re-direct exam of Plaintiff witness #2
COUNT: 9.41
Plaintiff exhibit #53 received into evidence
COUNT: 9.43
All admitted exhibits published to the Jury
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COUNT: 10.38
State rests
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COUNT: 10.39
Defense witness #1 - Edward Allen Walker - direct exam
COUNT: 11.01
Cross exam of Defense witness #1
COUNT: 11.25
Re-direct exam of Defense Witness #1
COUNT: 11.35
Defense rests
COUNT: 1.15
Court resumes, all parties, including Jury present in the
courtroom, court reads jury instructions
COUNT: 1.45
Closing Argument - State
COUNT: 2.08
Closing Argument - Defense
COUNT: 2.38
State rebuttal
COUNT: 2.45
Clerk administered oath to Baliff - Baliff takes Jury out to
deliberate
COUNT: 4.21
Outside of Jury, court puts question jury asked on the record.
COUNT: 4.25
All parties, including the Jury present in the courtroom. Clerk
reads verdict.
Defendant, Edward Allen Walker is found guilty by the Jury as
charged in the information
COUNT: 4.29
Jury is polled by the clerk. Jury dismissed.
COUNT: 4.31
Outside of Jury, Defense attorney makes a motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, defense has 10 days to prepare Motion,
State has 10 days to respond. .
Both parties to submit Motions to Judge Kennedy at the Matheson
building, he will hear and rule on Defense Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict there before sentencing.
Judge Adkins will sentence the defendant at the West Jordan
building. APP to interview defendant at Utah State Prison and will
prepare a Presentence report.
Court reporter, Michelle Batty present for all proceedings.
06-08-05 Filed: Jury Instructions and Verdict
06-08-05 Note: JURY TRIAL minutes modified.
06-08-05 SNT/APP scheduled on July 21, 2005 at 01:00 PM in WJ Courtroom
36 with Judge ADKINS.
06-13-05 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned.
06-13-05 Note: Case Transferred to Salt Lake City District Case #
051903660
07-15-05 Note: As per Kimberly, clerk to Judge Kennedy, case was
transferred and will be sentencing with Judge Kennedy at the
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Matheson building.
07-15-05 SNT/APP Cancelled.
Reason: Court Ordered
07-22-05 Filed: Pre-Sentence Report from APP
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01-05-06 Filed: Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume I, dated 6-6-05,
Michelle Beatty, Court Reporter
01-05-06 Filed: Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume II, dated 6-7-05,
Michelle Beatty, Court Reporter
06-02-07 Judge MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN assigned.
04-30-08 Judge MARK KOURIS assigned.
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